Belarus LGBTQI+ rights statement

February - April 2026

The pivotal event of the period was the adoption of amendments to the Code of Administrative Offenses introducing liability for the “propaganda of homosexual relationships, pedophilia, gender transition, and childlessness.” The draft law, approved by the Council of the Republic on April 2, 2026, was signed by Alexander Lukashenko on April 15 and thereby firmly enshrined in the legal system. As a result, the long-standing policy trajectory toward restricting the rights of LGBTQ+ people has received direct legal codification, marking a transition to a more rigid and systemic phase of state pressure.

Within the framework of the amendments, administrative liability is introduced for the “propaganda of homosexual relationships, gender transition, childlessness, and pedophilia,” arbitrarily grouped together as equivalent phenomena. Penalties include fines and administrative arrest, with harsher sanctions provided for in cases involving the “familiarization of minors.”

This legal framing is not neutral: it deliberately equates the very existence of LGBTQ+ people with socially dangerous and criminal phenomena. In this way, systemic homophobia and transphobia receive a legal foundation at the level of law. Queer identity is criminalized and labeled as “socially unacceptable.”

In effect, the state creates conditions in which any mention of LGBTQ+ topics — from human rights advocacy to personal narratives — can be interpreted as an offense. Particularly indicative is the tightening of penalties in cases involving the “familiarization of minors,” which opens the door to arbitrary persecution under the pretext of “protecting children.”

Thus, this represents a fundamental shift: from propagandistic homophobia to its formal entrenchment within the legal system.

Against this backdrop, the practice of designating LGBTQ+-related online resources as “extremist materials” continues, effectively equating community visibility and self-organization with a threat to state security.

In March 2026, the Instagram accounts of the intersectional feminist LGBTQ+ initiative “prismatica.belarus,” the project on LGBTQ+ visibility “takija.samyja,” and the personal accounts of public queer activists Nasta Bazar and Jane (@jane.horney) were designated as “extremist.”

The very visibility of queer people and communities is declared “extremism.” Such practice undermines legal certainty and creates conditions in which any form of self-expression can be interpreted as a violation.

State media continue to actively support and reinforce this course through hate speech and stigmatization.

In the March 23, 2026 publication of the newspaper “Zvyazda,” titled “Come visit us in Lida!”, it is claimed that families are moving to Belarus from Europe in order to protect their children from “LGBT propaganda.” In this way, LGBTQ+ topics are once again framed as a threat to children, which is a classic instrument of fueling moral panic.

In the publications of SB.by during the period under review, LGBTQ+ topics are consistently used as a tool to discredit human rights, civil society, and the political opposition.

In the article of March 11, 2026, “A word, once spoken, cannot be taken back,” human rights in Europe are described as being accessible only to the “LGBT+ crowd.” This distorts the very idea of the universality of rights and deliberately constructs an image of LGBTQ+ people as an “alien elite.”

In the article of March 17, 2026, “By any means necessary…,” LGBTQ+ topics are embedded within a narrative about the “destructive” activities of NGOs. The wording “defenders of gays and forest plantations” is used, and the agenda itself is linked to foreign funding and interference. As a result, a persistent association is constructed: LGBTQ+ = external influence = threat to the state. This is an important element of propaganda logic, allowing pressure on civil society to be justified under the pretext of protecting national sovereignty.

In the February 19, 2026 material “Dirty Imitators,” LGBTQ+ vocabulary and gender-stigmatizing imagery are used to discredit political opponents (“the exiled”). References to “femoks,” “butches,” and other identities are presented in a derogatory and mocking manner. In this way, political positions and activities are replaced with discussions or fabrications about the gender and sexuality of opponents in an attempt to portray them as unserious, “abnormal,” and unworthy of trust.

At the same time, homosexuality and gender nonconformity themselves are used as markers of moral decline and “degeneracy,” including through the use of terms such as “perversion” and references to “Sodom and Gomorrah.” This constructs a stable linkage of “opposition — LGBTQ+ — deviation” and is embedded within a broader narrative contrasting “traditional” Belarus with a “decaying West.”

As a result, homophobia functions not only as a form of discrimination against LGBTQ+ people, but also as a tool of political delegitimization, expanding its role into a universal language of discreditation.

This same line is continued in a publication on the Telegram channel of propagandist Grigory Azaryonok dated March 12, 2026, in which a homophobic metaphor is used as a tool of political delegitimization.

The post uses a sexualized image of male group homosexual interaction as a metaphor for the political unification of Belarusian opposition democratic forces. Homosexual practice is deliberately chosen as an image intended to provoke disgust and serve as a means of humiliating political opponents and their positions. Thus, homosexuality is used as a language of degradation, while the very idea of same-sex relationships is presented as something shameful and discrediting.

Pro-government Telegram channels, such as “Yellow Plums,” continue to broadcast an even more radical form of this rhetoric.

In a publication dated March 4, 2026, explicitly offensive language (“perverts,” “deviants”) is used in relation to LGBTQ+ people, along with personalized attacks.

Importantly, in such publications, homophobia is often combined with a conspiratorial narrative about “external funding” and a “Western plan.” LGBTQ+ people and activists are portrayed as dependent, corrupt, and morally inferior subjects.

This combination—dehumanization and accusations of external influence—intensifies hostility and constructs the image of an “enemy within.” In this context, hate speech ceases to be merely rhetoric and begins to perform a mobilizing function, justifying pressure and repression that take on a legal character.

Conclusion

The period under review marks a movement toward the institutionalization of anti-LGBTQ+ policy. The approval of amendments to the Code of Administrative Offenses introducing liability for the “propaganda of homosexual relationships and gender transition” enshrines a discriminatory approach at the legislative level and expands the grounds for persecution to include any form of public visibility.

Substantively, these changes reproduce the logic of Russian legislation on “propaganda” and fit into a broader regional trend of adopting similar norms, including analogous initiatives in post-Soviet countries. This indicates the growing influence of the Russian legal and ideological vector, within which LGBTQ+ topics are systematically constructed as a threat to the state and society.

A characteristic feature is the merging of LGBTQ+ topics with pedophilia and “threats to children” in both legal and media fields. Such linkage intensifies stigmatization and creates a morally charged justification for repressive measures.

At the same time, the media discourse is built around the opposition “Belarus — West,” where LGBTQ+ is used as a marker of a “foreign,” “imposed” ideology. In publications by state media and pro-government channels, LGBTQ+ topics are associated with external funding, political opposition, and the “degeneration” of European societies. This constructs a stable “us — them” framework, in which LGBTQ+ people and associated initiatives are positioned on the side of an “external threat,” while simultaneously being labeled as “internal enemies” to be fought.

Against this background, the practice of recognizing LGBTQ+ content as “extremist” is expanding, demonstrating a shift in focus from controlling specific actions to restricting the very possibility of LGBTQ+ existence in the public sphere.

Thus, during the period under review, a more rigid and coordinated model of pressure is taking shape, in which legislative changes, propaganda narratives, and law enforcement practices reinforce one another.

Under these conditions, support for LGBTQ+ people becomes critically important. The growth of legal risks and the intensification of hostile rhetoric increase the vulnerability of the community, making initiatives of mutual aid, the preservation of safe spaces, and access to psychological and legal support especially important.