Monitoring of Discriminatory References and Repressive Practices Targeting LGBTQ People in Belarus

The reporting period demonstrates a further tightening of anti-LGBTQ policy in Belarus and a shift toward more targeted and systemic forms of control. While previous monitoring reports documented the legislative institutionalization of discrimination, the intensification of state propaganda, and the beginning of practical implementation of new restrictions, the current period increasingly demonstrates the expansion of state security control over the everyday and digital lives of LGBTQ people.

New evidence points to monitoring of social networks and online activity, checks of mobile devices, attempts to recruit LGBTQ people as informants, the use of dating applications to arrange staged meetings, as well as pressure on relatives and close contacts of people who have left Belarus. Thus, repressive pressure is extending from the public sphere directly into the private lives and social connections of the community.

At the same time, the already established propaganda model is being maintained and intensified, in which LGBTQ-related issues are used to discredit the democratic opposition, human rights defenders, and the Belarusian diaspora. At the same time, the rhetoric is becoming increasingly sexualized and dehumanizing, while queer identity is used not only as an object of direct stigmatization but also as a universal tool of political humiliation.

From Public Stigmatization to Targeted State Security Control

The main new trend of the period is the intensification of control over LGBTQ people in the digital environment.

In material published by TG House on 7 August, the organization notes that in recent months law enforcement and security structures have become more active in monitoring social networks and the online activity of LGBTQ people. Particular attention is paid to Instagram and TikTok, including posts, stories, and comments. According to reports received by the organization, security officers do not always conceal their presence and may view content from official work accounts.

An even more serious trend is reports of attempts by security structures to recruit LGBTQ people. According to TG House, some people are forced to register on dating applications, establish contact with other LGBTQ people, and arrange meetings where security officers are already waiting for them. This indicates a shift from monitoring the community toward active penetration of its social networks.

This practice creates a fundamentally different level of risk. Dating applications, social networks, and other digital spaces that normally serve as tools for communication and community-building may become instruments of state control and penetration into the community's social connections.

It is particularly important that pressure does not necessarily end after a person leaves Belarus. TG House reports cases in which, following the evacuation of LGBTQ people to European Union countries, security officers visit their relatives, contact their close friends and acquaintances, and attempt to obtain information about their whereabouts and activities.

These cases indicate the emerging transnational character of state pressure, in which emigration itself does not necessarily mean an end to persecution. Control may extend to relatives, social connections, and a person's digital activity after they have left Belarus.

Recruitment, Pressure, and the Use of LGBTQ Identity as a Tool of Control

These observations are supported by data from the TG House review of the situation of the LGBTQ+ community in Belarus during the first half of 2026. The organization documented 20 cases of persecution and pressure by law enforcement and security structures, including checks of phones and private correspondence, arbitrary detentions, monitoring of social networks, interrogations, collection of personal data, pressure on relatives, and attempts at recruitment as informants.

The full TG House review of the situation of the LGBTQ+ community in Belarus during the first half of 2026 provides detailed information on these practices.

One particularly illustrative case was documented in June 2026, when, after a homosexual man's mobile phone was searched, KGB officers demanded that he cooperate and collect information about other members of the LGBTQ+ community. After he left Belarus, state authorities continued to inquire about his whereabouts through his relatives.

This case demonstrates a fundamental change in the nature of repression. LGBTQ people are becoming not only objects of state control but also potential instruments for obtaining information about the community itself. In other words, state repression begins to exploit the internal social connections of the LGBTQ community against the community itself.

Additional evidence of this practice is provided by an interview with Alyaksei Pavlyukou, published on 7 August by Viasna. It is important to note that the events described by him took place in 2023, that is, before the adoption of the new anti-LGBTQ legislation. Nevertheless, the case demonstrates that some of the mechanisms of pressure that are now becoming more systematic were already being used by security structures at that time.

According to Pavlyukou, while studying at the Military Medical Institute, a counterintelligence officer gained access to his phone and Telegram account, checked his correspondence, subscriptions, and photographs, asked questions about his sexual orientation and about other gay people he knew, and threatened problems for him and his family.

It is particularly significant that the pressure simultaneously targeted political loyalty and sexual identity. The counterintelligence officer asked about the young man's attitude toward the opposition, participation in protests, support for Ukraine, and relatives in Ukraine, while simultaneously using his LGBTQ identity as a basis for threats and pressure.

Thus, anti-LGBTQ repression is becoming increasingly intertwined with the broader system of political control. Queer identity becomes an additional vulnerability factor that can be used by security structures for intimidation, blackmail, obtaining information, and coercion into cooperation.

Intensification of Repression in the Digital Space

Another long-term trend is the transformation of digital activity into an independent object of repressive control.

The TG House review notes that law enforcement officers check mobile phones and private correspondence, monitor LGBTQ people's activity on social networks, and hold people accountable in connection with subscriptions to resources designated as "extremist." The organization documented three cases in which subscriptions to such resources resulted in administrative prosecution, confiscation of electronic devices, and pressure from law enforcement officers.

Thus, the previously documented trend of designating LGBTQ-related resources as "extremist" is acquiring an additional dimension. The very existence of a digital connection with such a resource — a subscription, storage of materials, or interaction with it — may become grounds for pressure.

This creates a situation in which the boundary between public and private activity is effectively blurred. A person may face risks not only because of their own public statements, but also because of the contents of their phone, their subscription list, private correspondence, or social contacts.

Dehumanization as a Tool of Political Control

Against the backdrop of expanding real-world repressive practices, an extremely aggressive propaganda environment persists. In July and August, pro-government Telegram channels continued to use LGBTQ-related issues to discredit political opponents and the Belarusian diaspora.

Thus, in a 15 July publication by Grigory Azaryonok, accompanied by a link to a GUBAZA publication, a detained person is described using homophobic language and simultaneously associated with the Kastus Kalinouski Regiment. His sexual orientation is used as an argument to discredit both the individual and the unit as a whole.

This continues the trend documented in previous monitoring reports: LGBTQ identity is transformed into a universal political label. It is used to portray an opponent as morally inferior, disloyal, "alien," and connected to an external enemy.

At the same time, the sexualized form of political humiliation persists. In a 7 August publication by Ratannihilator, a reaction to an interview with a non-binary trans man who was forced to emigrate from Belarus because of pressure is accompanied by transphobic and homophobic insults, sexualized descriptions, and humiliation of his gender identity.

Characteristically, such materials do not merely stigmatize particular individuals. They connect LGBTQ identity with democratic activism, emigration, and the 2020 protests, creating a stable causal construction: queer identity → opposition → emigration → political disloyalty.

Thus, the propaganda narrative continues to serve the function of legitimizing repression: if an LGBTQ person is simultaneously portrayed as a political opponent, an "agent of the West," or a participant in the "zmagar" movement, pressure against them can be presented as part of a struggle against a political threat.

Expansion of the Propaganda Target: From LGBTQ People to Any Criticism of the "Traditional Model"

Another persistent feature is the use of international LGBTQ-related issues to construct an image of an external threat.

For example, a 6 August publication by Ratannihilator about a school seminar in Germany uses LGBTQ-related issues to construct a caricature of the European education system. Discussion of LGBTQ rights and sexual education is accompanied by openly dehumanizing language and presented as a threat to children.

This publication continues a strategy already identified in previous monitoring reports, but in a new context: following the entry into force of Belarus's anti-LGBTQ legislation, such external examples continue to be used to construct an image of Europe as a source of threats from which Belarus supposedly needs to protect itself. Any attempt to discuss sexual and gender diversity is placed within a framework of danger.

Conclusion

The reporting period demonstrates the further transition of anti-LGBTQ policy from the legislative and propaganda levels toward targeted control infrastructure. The most significant new trends include monitoring of digital activity, the use of dating applications for potential recruitment and staged encounters, pressure on relatives of LGBTQ people who have emigrated, and attempts to use members of the community to obtain information about others. At the same time, the use of extremism legislation and control over digital resources continues, further blurring the boundary between public activity and private life.

Thus, LGBTQ people are increasingly becoming simultaneous objects of political and social control. Queer identity is used as a vulnerability factor that can be combined with accusations of political disloyalty, emigration, or links to the democratic movement. Under these conditions, continued documentation of persecution and support for the Belarusian queer community — both inside the country and in exile — are particularly important. Safe communication channels, digital security, legal and psychological assistance, as well as support for organizations that document violations and help people evacuate, are becoming critical elements of community protection.